Marchetti Giorgio
University of Urbino, Urbino, Italy.
Cogn Process. 2006 Sep;7(3):163-94. doi: 10.1007/s10339-006-0144-9. Epub 2006 Aug 4.
The paper presents the two main assumptions of Attentional Semantics--(A) and (B), and its main aim (C). (A) Conscious experience is determined by attention: there cannot be consciousness without attention. Consciousness is explained as the product of attentional activity. Attentional activity can be performed thanks to a special kind of energy: nervous energy. This energy is supplied by the organ of attention. When we perform attentional activity, we use our nervous energy. This activity directly affects the organ of attention, causing a variation in the state of the nervous energy. This variation constitutes the phenomenal aspect of consciousness. (B) Words are tools to pilot attention. The meanings of words isolate, de-contextualize, "freeze" and classify in an articulated system the ever-changing and multiform stream of our conscious experiences. Each meaning is composed of the sequence of invariable elements that, independently of any individual occurrence of a given conscious experience, are responsible for the production of any instance of that conscious experience. The elements composing the meanings of words are attentional operations: each word conveys the condensed instructions on the attentional operations one has to perform if one wants to consciously experience what is expressed through and by it. (C) Attentional Semantics aims at finding the attentional instruction conveyed by the meanings of words. To achieve this goal, it tries: (1) to identify the sequence of the elementary conscious experiences that invariably accompany, and are prompted by, the use of the word being analyzed; (2) to describe these conscious experiences in terms of the attentional operations that are responsible for their production; and (3) to identify the unconscious and non-conscious operations that, directly or indirectly, serve either as the support that makes it possible for the attentional operations to take place, be completed, and occur in a certain way, or as the necessary complement that makes it possible to execute and implement the activities determined and triggered by the conscious experiences. The origins of Attentional Semantics are also presented, and the methodological problems researchers encounter when analyzing meanings in attentional terms are discussed. Finally, a brief comparison with the other kinds of semantics is made.
本文介绍了注意力语义学的两个主要假设——(A)和(B),以及其主要目标(C)。(A)有意识的体验由注意力决定:没有注意力就没有意识。意识被解释为注意力活动的产物。注意力活动借助一种特殊的能量得以进行:神经能量。这种能量由注意力器官提供。当我们进行注意力活动时,我们使用神经能量。这种活动直接影响注意力器官,导致神经能量状态发生变化。这种变化构成了意识的现象层面。(B)词语是引导注意力的工具。词语的意义在一个清晰的系统中对我们不断变化、形式多样的有意识体验流进行隔离、去情境化、“冻结”和分类。每个意义都由一系列不变的元素组成,这些元素独立于给定有意识体验的任何个别出现情况,负责产生该有意识体验的任何实例。构成词语意义的元素是注意力操作:每个词语都传达了关于注意力操作的浓缩指令,如果一个人想要有意识地体验通过该词语并由其表达的内容,就必须执行这些操作。(C)注意力语义学旨在找出词语意义所传达的注意力指令。为实现这一目标,它试图:(1)确定在使用被分析词语时始终伴随并由其引发的基本有意识体验序列;(2)根据负责产生这些有意识体验的注意力操作来描述这些有意识体验;(3)确定直接或间接作为使注意力操作得以发生、完成并以某种方式出现的支持,或作为使执行和实施由有意识体验所决定和触发的活动成为可能的必要补充的无意识和非意识操作。本文还介绍了注意力语义学的起源,并讨论了研究人员在从注意力角度分析意义时遇到的方法学问题。最后,与其他类型的语义学进行了简要比较。