Maisey Susan, Steel Nick, Marsh Roy, Gillam Stephen, Fleetcroft Robert, Howe Amanda
School of Medicine, Health Policy and Practice, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.
J Health Serv Res Policy. 2008 Jul;13(3):133-9. doi: 10.1258/jhsrp.2008.007118.
To understand the effects of a large scale 'payment for performance' scheme (the Quality and Outcomes Framework [QOF]) on professional roles and the delivery of primary care in the English National Health Service.
Qualitative semi-structured interview study. Twenty-four clinicians were interviewed during 2006: one general practitioner and one practice nurse in 12 general practices in eastern England with a broad range of sociodemographic and organizational characteristics.
Participants reported substantial improvements in teamwork and in the organization, consistency and recording of care for conditions incentivized in the scheme, but not for non-incentivized conditions. The need to carry out and record specific clinical activities was felt to have changed the emphasis from 'patient led' consultations and listening to patients' concerns. Loss of continuity of care and of patient choice were described. Nurses experienced increased workload but enjoyed more autonomy and job satisfaction. Doctors acknowledged improved disease management and teamwork but expressed unease about 'box-ticking' and increased demands of team supervision, despite better terms and conditions. Doctors were less motivated to achieve performance indicators where they disputed the evidence on which they were based. Participants expressed little engagement with results of patient surveys or patient involvement initiatives. Some participants described data manipulation to maximize practice income. Many felt overwhelmed by the flow of policy initiatives.
Payment for performance is driving major changes in the roles and organization of English primary health care teams. Non-incentivized activities and patients' concerns may receive less clinical attention. Practitioners would benefit from improved dissemination of the evidence justifying the inclusion of new performance indicators in the QOF.
了解大规模“按绩效付费”计划(质量与结果框架[QOF])对英国国家医疗服务体系中专业角色及初级医疗服务提供的影响。
定性半结构式访谈研究。2006年期间对24名临床医生进行了访谈:在英格兰东部12家具有广泛社会人口统计学和组织特征的全科诊所中,各访谈了一名全科医生和一名执业护士。
参与者报告称,在团队合作以及该计划中受激励疾病的护理组织、一致性和记录方面有显著改善,但非激励性疾病的护理则没有。开展和记录特定临床活动的需求被认为改变了“以患者为主导”的咨询重点,不再关注患者的担忧。有人描述了护理连续性和患者选择的丧失。护士工作量增加,但享有更多自主权和工作满意度。医生认可疾病管理和团队合作有所改善,但对“打勾”做法以及团队监督需求增加表示不安,尽管待遇有所改善。当医生对绩效指标所依据的证据提出质疑时,他们实现这些指标的积极性较低。参与者对患者调查结果或患者参与倡议的参与度不高。一些参与者描述了为使诊所收入最大化而进行的数据操纵。许多人感到被政策倡议的洪流压得喘不过气来。
按绩效付费正在推动英国初级医疗团队的角色和组织发生重大变化。非激励性活动和患者的担忧可能较少受到临床关注。从业者将受益于更好地传播为将新绩效指标纳入QOF提供依据的证据。