Yeates Giles Noel, Gracey Fergus, McGrath Joanna Collicutt
Community Head Injury Service, Aylesbury, UK.
Neuropsychol Rehabil. 2008 Oct-Dec;18(5-6):566-89. doi: 10.1080/09602010802151532.
The judgement of personality change following acquired brain injury (ABI) is a powerful subjective and social action, and has been shown to be associated with a range of serious psychosocial consequences. Traditional conceptualisations of personality change (e.g., Lishman, 1998) have largely derived from individualist concepts of personality (e.g., Eysenck, 1967). These assume a direct link between neurological damage and altered personhood, accounting predominantly for their judgements of change. This assumption is found as commonly in family accounts of change as in professional discourse. Recent studies and perspectives from the overlapping fields of social neuroscience, cognitive approaches to self and identity and psychosocial processes following ABI mount a serious challenge to this assumption. These collectively identify a range of direct and indirect factors that may influence the judgement or felt sense of change in personhood by survivors of ABI and their significant others. These perspectives are reviewed within a biopsychosocial framework: neurological and neuropsychological deficits, psychological mechanisms and psychosocial processes. Importantly, these perspectives are applied to generate a range of clinical interventions that were not identifiable within traditional conceptualisations of personality changes following ABI.
对后天性脑损伤(ABI)后人格变化的判断是一种有力的主观和社会行为,并且已被证明与一系列严重的心理社会后果相关。传统的人格变化概念(例如,利什曼,1998年)在很大程度上源自个人主义的人格概念(例如,艾森克,1967年)。这些概念假定神经损伤与人格改变之间存在直接联系,主要用于解释他们对变化的判断。这种假设在家庭关于变化的描述以及专业论述中都很常见。社会神经科学、自我与身份的认知方法以及ABI后的心理社会过程等交叉领域的最新研究和观点对这一假设提出了严峻挑战。这些研究共同确定了一系列直接和间接因素,这些因素可能会影响ABI幸存者及其重要他人对人格变化的判断或感知。这些观点在生物心理社会框架内进行了综述:神经和神经心理学缺陷、心理机制和心理社会过程。重要的是,这些观点被用于产生一系列在传统的ABI后人格变化概念中无法识别的临床干预措施。