de Vignemont F, Haggard P
CNRS-EHESS-ENS, Paris, France.
Soc Neurosci. 2008;3(3-4):421-33. doi: 10.1080/17470910802045109. Epub 2008 May 23.
Performing an action and observing it activate the same internal representations of action. The representations are therefore shared between self and other (shared representations of action, SRA). But what exactly is shared? At what level within the hierarchical structure of the motor system do SRA occur? Understanding the content of SRA is important in order to decide what theoretical work SRA can perform. In this paper, we provide some conceptual clarification by raising three main questions: (i) are SRA semantic or pragmatic representations of action?; (ii) are SRA sensory or motor representations?; (iii) are SRA representations of the action as a global unit or as a set of elementary motor components? After outlining a model of the motor hierarchy, we conclude that the best candidate for SRA is intentions in action, defined as the motor plans of the dynamic sequence of movements. We shed new light on SRA by highlighting the causal efficacy of intentions in action. This in turn explains phenomena such as inhibition of imitation.
执行一个动作并观察它会激活相同的动作内部表征。因此，这些表征在自我和他人之间是共享的（动作的共享表征，SRA）。但究竟共享的是什么？SRA在运动系统的层次结构中的哪个层面发生？为了确定SRA能完成哪些理论工作，理解SRA的内容很重要。在本文中，我们通过提出三个主要问题提供了一些概念上的澄清：（i）SRA是动作的语义表征还是语用表征？；（ii）SRA是感觉表征还是运动表征？；（iii）SRA是将动作表征为一个整体单元还是一组基本运动成分？在概述了运动层次模型后，我们得出结论，SRA的最佳候选者是行动中的意图，定义为动态运动序列的运动计划。我们通过强调行动中意图的因果效力，为SRA提供了新的视角。这反过来又解释了诸如模仿抑制等现象。
