Savulescu Julian, Kahane Guy
University of Oxford - Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, St Cross College, St Giles, Oxford OX1 3LZ, United Kingdom.
Bioethics. 2009 Jun;23(5):274-90. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00687.x.
According to what we call the Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB),couples who decide to have a child have a significant moral reason to select the child who, given his or her genetic endowment, can be expected to enjoy the most well-being. In the first part of this paper, we introduce PB,explain its content, grounds, and implications, and defend it against various objections. In the second part, we argue that PB is superior to competing principles of procreative selection such as that of procreative autonomy.In the third part of the paper, we consider the relation between PB and disability. We develop a revisionary account of disability, in which disability is a species of instrumental badness that is context- and person-relative.Although PB instructs us to aim to reduce disability in future children whenever possible, it does not privilege the normal. What matters is not whether future children meet certain biological or statistical norms, but what level of well-being they can be expected to have.
根据我们所谓的生育善原则（PB），决定要孩子的夫妇有一个重要的道德理由去选择那个基于其基因禀赋有望享有最大福祉的孩子。在本文的第一部分，我们介绍生育善原则，解释其内容、依据和影响，并为其抵御各种反对意见。在第二部分，我们认为生育善原则优于诸如生育自主权等其他生育选择原则。在本文的第三部分，我们考虑生育善原则与残疾之间的关系。我们提出了一种关于残疾的修正性解释，即残疾是一种与背景和个人相关的工具性坏处。尽管生育善原则指导我们尽可能减少未来孩子的残疾，但它并不偏袒正常情况。重要的不是未来孩子是否符合某些生物学或统计学标准，而是他们有望拥有怎样的福祉水平。
