Petersen Thomas Søbirk
J Med Ethics. 2015 Sep;41(9):771-4. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2014-102420. Epub 2015 Apr 23.
The aim of this paper is to criticise the well-discussed principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB) lately refined by Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane. First, it is argued that advocates of PB leave us with an implausible justification for the moral partiality towards the child (or children) which reproducers decide to bring into existence as compared with all other individuals. This is implausible because the reasons given in favour of the partiality of PB, which are based on practical reason and common-sense morality, can just as well be used to guide reproducers to make choices that do not support partiality towards one's possible children. This seems to be true as least in some situations. Second, it is argued that Jakob Elster's recent critique of PB is problematic and specifically that a counterexample designed by Elster to criticise PB because of its partiality towards one's own children misses the target. Finally, a genuine counterexample to PB is developed in order to show that the partiality of PB leads to the wrong answer in a specific case.
本文旨在批判近来由朱利安·萨夫勒斯库和盖伊·卡哈内完善的、已被广泛讨论的生殖利他主义（PB）原则。首先，有人认为，与所有其他个体相比，PB的支持者为生育者决定带到世上的孩子所表现出的道德偏袒提供了一个难以置信的理由。这难以置信，是因为支持PB偏袒性的理由基于实践理性和常识道德，同样也可用于引导生育者做出不支持偏袒自己可能生育的孩子的选择。至少在某些情况下似乎确实如此。其次，有人认为雅各布·埃尔斯特最近对PB的批判存在问题，具体而言，埃尔斯特设计的一个因PB偏袒自己孩子而批判PB的反例未击中目标。最后，提出了一个针对PB的真正反例，以表明PB的偏袒性在一个特定案例中导致了错误答案。
