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动态图上合作行为的演变

Evolution of cooperation on dynamical graphs.

作者信息

Kun Adám, Scheuring István

机构信息

Department of Plant Taxonomy and Ecology, Institute of Biology, Eötvös University, Budapest, Hungary.

出版信息

Biosystems. 2009 Apr;96(1):65-8. doi: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2008.11.009. Epub 2008 Nov 27.

DOI:10.1016/j.biosystems.2008.11.009
PMID:19095039
Abstract

There are two key characteristic of animal and human societies: (1) degree heterogeneity, meaning that not all individual have the same number of associates; and (2) the interaction topology is not static, i.e. either individuals interact with different set of individuals at different times of their life, or at least they have different associations than their parents. Earlier works have shown that population structure is one of the mechanisms promoting cooperation. However, most studies had assumed that the interaction network can be described by a regular graph (homogeneous degree distribution). Recently there are an increasing number of studies employing degree heterogeneous graphs to model interaction topology. But mostly the interaction topology was assumed to be static. Here we investigate the fixation probability of the cooperator strategy in the prisoner's dilemma, when interaction network is a random regular graph, a random graph or a scale-free graph and the interaction network is allowed to change. We show that the fixation probability of the cooperator strategy is lower when the interaction topology is described by a dynamical graph compared to a static graph. Even a limited network dynamics significantly decreases the fixation probability of cooperation, an effect that is mitigated stronger by degree heterogeneous networks topology than by a degree homogeneous one. We have also found that from the considered graph topologies the decrease of fixation probabilities due to graph dynamics is the lowest on scale-free graphs.

摘要

动物和人类社会有两个关键特征

(1)度的异质性,即并非所有个体都有相同数量的关联;(2)交互拓扑不是静态的,也就是说,个体要么在生命的不同时期与不同的个体集合进行交互,要么至少他们与父母有不同的关联。早期的研究表明,种群结构是促进合作的机制之一。然而,大多数研究都假设交互网络可以用规则图(均匀度分布)来描述。最近,越来越多的研究采用度异质图来对交互拓扑进行建模。但大多假设交互拓扑是静态的。在这里,当交互网络是随机规则图、随机图或无标度图且交互网络允许变化时,我们研究了囚徒困境中合作者策略的固定概率。我们表明,与静态图相比,当用动态图描述交互拓扑时,合作者策略的固定概率更低。即使是有限的网络动态也会显著降低合作的固定概率,度异质网络拓扑比度均匀网络拓扑对这种影响的缓解作用更强。我们还发现,在所考虑的图拓扑中,由于图动态导致的固定概率下降在无标度图上是最低的。

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