Disasters. 2010 Jan;34 Suppl 1:S103-23. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7717.2009.01101.x.
This paper assesses the political nature of reconstruction in Lebanon in the wake of the 33-day war between Hezbollah and Israel in the summer of 2006. It illustrates the extent to which Arab and Gulf States assumed a major role in the reconstruction effort that followed the fighting. A significant competitive dynamic attached itself to the reconstruction of Lebanon, with external actors attempting to protect and defend their favoured constituencies via reconstruction activities. The reconstruction endeavour reflected Lebanon's internal political divisions as well as wider regional competition. Using the metaphors of 'software' and 'hardware', the study examines how in general many Western states and Western-backed international institutions favoured governance programming (software) while many Arab and Gulf State donors preferred physical reconstruction projects (hardware), often with an emphasis on large-scale, high-visibility infrastructure projects. The paper argues that the latter were able to connect more effectively with the political culture of Lebanon.
本文评估了 2006 年夏真主党与以色列之间为期 33 天的战争之后,黎巴嫩重建的政治性质。它说明了阿拉伯国家和海湾国家在随后的战斗中在重建努力中承担了主要角色的程度。在黎巴嫩的重建过程中,外部行为体试图通过重建活动来保护和捍卫他们所支持的选区,因此产生了显著的竞争动态。重建努力反映了黎巴嫩内部的政治分歧以及更广泛的地区竞争。该研究使用“软件”和“硬件”的比喻,考察了一般来说,许多西方国家和西方支持的国际机构倾向于治理方案(软件),而许多阿拉伯和海湾国家的捐助者则更喜欢实物重建项目(硬件),通常侧重于大规模、高可见度的基础设施项目。本文认为,后者能够更有效地与黎巴嫩的政治文化相联系。