White Joseph
Case Western Reserve University, USA.
J Health Polit Policy Law. 2009 Aug;34(4):543-83. doi: 10.1215/03616878-2009-015.
Single-pool systems as defined in this article may be accompanied by two forms of voluntary health insurance (VHI): gap coverage for benefits not included in the statutory arrangement and parallel coverage through which individuals pay extra for ostensibly superior versions of the statutory benefits. In all cases the markets for this coverage are much smaller than the market for private insurance in the United States. In each case, the market for VHI depends on perceived inadequacy in the statutory system. With gap coverage, the extent of the statutory benefit package is a more basic issue than the gap coverage itself. Parallel coverage raises more significant independent issues. It is particularly related to the dynamics and politics of waiting lists in the statutory system. Waiting lists appear to be a greater concern in single-pool systems than in social insurance systems due to the effects of having spending on a government's budget and some perverse incentives for physicians. Single-pool approaches are less politically plausible in the United States than adaptation of social insurance models because they leave less room for private insurance and thus will be less attractive to advocates of the private sector; yet leaving any room at all requires that the statutory system be less attractive than advocates of national health insurance could probably justify politically.
本文所定义的单池系统可能伴随着两种形式的自愿健康保险(VHI):对法定安排中未涵盖福利的缺口保险,以及并行保险,即个人为表面上更优质的法定福利版本额外付费。在所有情况下,这种保险的市场规模都远小于美国的私人保险市场。在每种情况下,自愿健康保险市场都取决于人们认为法定体系存在的不足之处。对于缺口保险而言,法定福利套餐的范围比缺口保险本身更是一个基本问题。并行保险引发了更重大的独立问题。它尤其与法定体系中候诊名单的动态变化和政治因素相关。由于将支出计入政府预算以及对医生存在一些不当激励,候诊名单在单池系统中似乎比在社会保险系统中更受关注。在美国,单池模式在政治上不如社会保险模式可行,因为它们留给私人保险的空间较小,因此对私营部门的倡导者吸引力较小;然而,只要留出任何空间,就要求法定体系的吸引力低于国家医疗保险倡导者在政治上可能认为合理的水平。