McLeod Heather, Grobler Pieter
Department of Public Health and Family Medicine, University of Cape Town, South Africa.
Adv Health Econ Health Serv Res. 2009;21:159-96.
The South African health system has long been characterised by extreme inequalities in the allocation of financial and human resources. Voluntary private health insurance, delivered through medical schemes, accounts for some 60% of total expenditure but serves only the 14.8% of the population with higher incomes. A plan was articulated in 1994 to move to a National Health Insurance system with risk-adjusted payments to competing health funds, income cross-subsidies and mandatory membership for all those in employment, leading over time to universal coverage. This chapter describes the core institutional mechanism envisaged for a National Health Insurance system, the Risk Equalisation Fund (REF). A key issue that has emerged is the appropriate sequencing of the reforms and the impact on workers of possible trajectories is considered.
The design and functioning of the REF is described and the impact on competing health insurance funds is illustrated. Using a reference family earning at different income levels, the impact on worker of various trajectories of reform is demonstrated.
Risk equalization is a critical institutional component in moving towards a system of social or national health insurance in competitive markets, but the sequence of its implementation needs to be carefully considered. The adverse impact of risk equalization on low-income workers in the absence of income cross-subsidies and mandatory membership is considerable.
The South African experience of risk equalization is of interest as it attempts to introduce more solidarity into a small but highly competitive private insurance market. The methodology for considering the impact of reforms provides policymakers and politicians with a clearer understanding of the consequences of reform.
长期以来,南非卫生系统的特点是在财政和人力资源分配上存在极端不平等。通过医疗计划提供的自愿性私人医疗保险占总支出的约60%,但仅服务于14.8%的高收入人群。1994年提出了一项计划,要转向国家医疗保险系统,向相互竞争的健康基金进行风险调整支付、收入交叉补贴,并要求所有就业人员强制参保,随着时间推移实现全民覆盖。本章描述了国家医疗保险系统设想的核心制度机制,即风险均等化基金(REF)。出现的一个关键问题是改革的适当顺序,并考虑了可能的改革轨迹对工人的影响。
描述了REF的设计和运作,并说明了其对相互竞争的健康保险基金的影响。使用处于不同收入水平的参考家庭,展示了各种改革轨迹对工人的影响。
在竞争市场中,风险均等化是迈向社会或国家医疗保险体系的关键制度组成部分,但其实施顺序需要仔细考虑。在没有收入交叉补贴和强制参保的情况下,风险均等化对低收入工人的不利影响相当大。
南非的风险均等化经验值得关注,因为它试图在一个规模小但竞争激烈的私人保险市场中引入更多团结因素。考虑改革影响的方法为政策制定者和政治家提供了对改革后果更清晰的理解。