Vidal Fernando
Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin
Hist Human Sci. 2009 Feb;22(1):5-36. doi: 10.1177/0952695108099133.
If personhood is the quality or condition of being an individual person, "brainhood" could name the quality or condition of being a brain. This ontological quality would define the "cerebral subject" that has, at least in industrialized and highly medicalized societies, gained numerous social inscriptions since the mid-20th century. This article explores the historical development of brainhood. It suggests that the brain is necessarily the location of the "modern self," and that, consequently, the cerebral subject is the anthropological figure inherent to modernity (at least insofar as modernity gives supreme value to the individual as autonomous agent of choice and initiative). It further argues that the ideology of brainhood impelled neuroscientific investigation much more than it resulted from it, and sketches how an expanding constellation of neurocultural discourses and practices embodies and sustains that ideology.
如果人格是作为个体之人的特质或状态,那么“脑格”可以用来指代作为大脑的特质或状态。这种本体论特质将定义“大脑主体”,至少在工业化和高度医疗化的社会中,自20世纪中叶以来,它已获得了众多社会印记。本文探讨了脑格的历史发展。它表明大脑必然是“现代自我”的所在之处,因此,大脑主体是现代性所固有的人类学形象(至少就现代性将个体视为自主选择和主动行动的至高价值而言)。它进一步认为,脑格意识形态对神经科学研究的推动作用远大于神经科学研究对它的催生作用,并勾勒出不断扩展的神经文化话语和实践群是如何体现和维系这种意识形态的。
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