Paris School of Economics, 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France.
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2010 Jan 27;365(1538):271-80. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2009.0178.
In this paper, we consider that our experience of time (to come) depends on the emotions we feel when we imagine future pleasant or unpleasant events. A positive emotion such as relief or joy associated with a pleasant event that will happen in the future induces impatience. Impatience, in our context, implies that the experience of time up to the forthcoming event expands. A negative emotion such as grief or frustration associated with an unpleasant event that will happen in the future triggers anxiety. This will give the experience of time contraction. Time, therefore, is not exogeneously given to the individual and emotions, which link together events or situations, are a constitutive ingredient of the experience of time. Our theory can explain experimental evidence that people tend to prefer to perform painful actions earlier than pleasurable ones, contrary to the predictions yielded by the standard exponential discounting framework.
在本文中，我们认为我们对未来时间的体验取决于我们想象未来愉快或不愉快事件时的情绪。与未来将要发生的愉快事件相关的积极情绪，如解脱或喜悦，会引起不耐烦。在我们的语境中，不耐烦意味着到即将到来的事件的时间体验会扩大。与未来将要发生的不愉快事件相关的消极情绪，如悲伤或沮丧，会引发焦虑。这将导致时间的收缩。因此，时间不是个体外部赋予的，将事件或情况联系在一起的情绪是时间体验的构成要素。我们的理论可以解释实验证据，即与标准指数折扣框架的预测相反，人们往往更愿意更早地进行痛苦的行为，而不是愉快的行为。
