多任务处理、质量和绩效薪酬。
Multi-tasking, quality and pay for performance.
机构信息
Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway.
出版信息
Health Econ. 2011 Feb;20(2):225-38. doi: 10.1002/hec.1582.
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that: (i) the provider is (at least to some extent) altruistic; (ii) one dimension of quality is verifiable (dimension 1) and one dimension is not verifiable (dimension 2); (iii) the two quality dimensions can be either substitutes or complements. Our main result is that setting the price equal to the marginal benefit of the verifiable quality dimension can be optimal even if the two quality dimensions are substitutes.
我们提出了一个当服务质量具有两个维度时，购买方和服务提供商之间的最优合同模型。我们假设：（i）提供商至少在某种程度上是利他的；（ii）质量的一个维度是可验证的（维度 1），而另一个维度是不可验证的（维度 2）；（iii）这两个质量维度可以是替代品，也可以是互补品。我们的主要结果是，即使两个质量维度是替代品，将价格设定为可验证质量维度的边际收益也可能是最优的。
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