Mukunda Gautam, Oye Kenneth A, Mohr Scott C
Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307, USA.
Politics Life Sci. 2009 Sep;28(2):2-26. doi: 10.2990/28_2_2.
Synthetic biology seeks to create modular biological parts that can be assembled into useful devices, allowing the modification of biological systems with greater reliability, at lower cost, with greater speed, and by a larger pool of people than has been the case with traditional genetic engineering. We assess the offensive and defensive security implications of synthetic biology based on the insights of leading synthetic biologists into how the technology may develop, the projections of practicing biosecurity authorities on changes in the security context and potential security applications of synthetic biology, and joint appraisals of policy relevant sources of uncertainty. Synthetic biology appears to have minimal security implications in the near term, create modest offensive advantages in the medium term, and strengthen defensive capabilities against natural and engineered biological threats and enable novel potential offensive uses in the long term. To maximize defensive and minimize offensive effects of synthetic biology despite uncertainty, this essay suggests a combination of policy approaches, including community-based efforts, regulation and surveillance, further research, and the deliberate design of security and safety features into the technology.
合成生物学旨在创建模块化生物部件，这些部件可组装成有用的装置，从而能够以比传统基因工程更高的可靠性、更低的成本、更快的速度以及由更多的人员来改造生物系统。我们基于顶尖合成生物学家对该技术可能如何发展的见解、生物安全实际工作者对安全环境变化及合成生物学潜在安全应用的预测，以及对与政策相关的不确定性来源的联合评估，来评估合成生物学在攻防安全方面的影响。合成生物学短期内似乎对安全影响极小，中期会带来适度的进攻优势，长期则会增强抵御自然和人为生物威胁的防御能力，并催生新的潜在进攻用途。为了在存在不确定性的情况下最大限度地发挥合成生物学的防御作用并最小化其进攻影响，本文建议采用一系列政策方法相结合，包括基于社区的努力、监管与监测、进一步研究，以及在技术中特意设计安全与保障特性。
