Unit of Philosophy, Turku Institute for Advanced Studies, University of Turku, Assistentikatu 7, 20014, Turku, Finland.
Sci Eng Ethics. 2017 Dec;23(6):1541-1561. doi: 10.1007/s11948-016-9868-9. Epub 2017 Jan 10.
The SynBioSecurity argument says that synthetic biology introduces new risks of intentional misuse of synthetic pathogens and that, therefore, there is a need for extra regulations and oversight. This paper provides an analysis of the argument, sets forth a new version of it, and identifies three developments that raise biosecurity risks compared to the situation earlier. The developments include (1) a spread of the required know-how, (2) improved availability of the techniques, instruments and biological parts, and (3) new technical possibilities such as "resurrecting" disappeared pathogens. It is first shown that the general argument from SynBioSecurity needs to be qualified and that many improvements to biosecurity have already been implemented, most notably in the United States. Second, I suggest a new strain of the argument: the situation that most branches of synthetic biology fall under the gene technology regulation in the European Union and that this regulation in its current form does not adequately address SynBioSecurity risks together provide a weighty reason to review and possibly refine the legislation as well as the supervisory practices. Ethically speaking, the rise in the relative risk of bioterrorism brings to the fore new extrinsic issues.
合成生物安全性论证认为，合成生物学带来了故意滥用合成病原体的新风险，因此需要额外的法规和监督。本文对这一论点进行了分析，提出了一个新的版本，并确定了与早期相比，有三个发展会带来生物安全风险。这些发展包括：（1）所需专业知识的传播；（2）技术、仪器和生物部件的可用性提高；（3）“复活”已消失病原体等新的技术可能性。首先，证明了合成生物安全性的一般论证需要加以限定，而且已经实施了许多生物安全改进措施，尤其是在美国。其次，我提出了一个新的论证观点：欧盟大多数分支的合成生物学都属于基因技术法规管辖，而这种法规在其现有形式下不能充分应对合成生物安全性风险，这为审查和可能修改立法以及监督实践提供了一个有力的理由。从伦理角度来看，生物恐怖主义的相对风险上升带来了新的外在问题。
