Niebrój Lesław T, Jadamus-Niebrój Danuta
Zakład Filozofii i Pedagogiki Slakiego Uniwersytetu Medycznego w Katowicach ul. Medyków 12, 40-752 Katowice.
Ann Acad Med Stetin. 2009;55(1):107-10; discussion 110.
The assumption that moral responsibility is a constitutive feature of the human person could almost be considered as the raison d'être of ethics and consequently of bioethics. In fact, the concept of"common morality", which is becoming ever more popular within the mainstream of bioethics, assumes that certain, even if elementary, experience of moral responsibility (and understanding of it) is shared by all the people of every cultural (moral) tradition. Although the phenomenon of (moral) responsibility is seen as a moral question, its ultimate explanation needs reflection which goes beyond purely ethical considerations.
The phenomenological ontology as elaborated by R. Ingarden is accepted as the theoretical background of deliberations in this study. Methods of reasoning appropriate to this approach to phenomenology are used.
The phenomenon of human responsibility is analyzed--according to Ingarden's suggestion--from the point of view of the four "situations" in which responsibility appears: (I) to be responsible for something, (II) to accept responsibility for something, (III) to be called to responsibility for something, and (IV) to be acting responsibly. The ontological foundation of responsibility in each of these situations is then inquired. Ingarden's philosophical reflection leads to discovery of the ultimate ontological foundation of responsibility in: (I) objective axiology, (II) structure of an acting subject, and (III) a causality structure of reality. We discuss whether Ingarden's analyses are coherent with the concept of "common morality".
Although R. Ingarden is best known, especially to English-speaking readers, for his work in aesthetics, it should be emphasized that his phenomenological ontology can provide interesting insights into the understanding of the concept of responsibility which is fundamental to ethics/bioethics.
道德责任是人类个体的一个构成性特征，这一假设几乎可以被视为伦理学乃至生物伦理学存在的理由。事实上，“普遍道德”这一概念在生物伦理学主流中越来越流行，它假定每一种文化（道德）传统中的所有人都共享某种（即使是基本的）道德责任体验（以及对其的理解）。尽管（道德）责任现象被视为一个道德问题，但其最终解释需要超越纯粹伦理考量的反思。
本研究将R. 英伽登阐述的现象学本体论作为思考的理论背景。采用适合这种现象学方法的推理方法。
根据英伽登的建议，从责任出现的四种“情境”的角度分析了人类责任现象：（I）对某事负责，（II）对某事承担责任，（III）被要求对某事负责，以及（IV）负责地行动。然后探究每种情境中责任的本体论基础。英伽登的哲学反思导致在以下方面发现责任的最终本体论基础：（I）客观价值论，（II）行动主体的结构，以及（III）现实的因果结构。我们讨论英伽登的分析是否与“普遍道德”的概念一致。
尽管R. 英伽登尤其为英语读者所熟知的是他在美学方面的著作，但应该强调的是，他的现象学本体论能够为理解对伦理学/生物伦理学至关重要的责任概念提供有趣的见解。
