Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science.
Br J Sociol. 2010 Mar;61(1):83-106. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2009.01303.x.
This paper looks at the dilemmas posed by 'expertise' in high-technology regulation by examining the US Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) 'type-certification' process, through which they evaluate new designs of civil aircraft. It observes that the FAA delegate a large amount of this work to the manufacturers themselves, and discusses why they do this by invoking arguments from the sociology of science and technology. It suggests that - contrary to popular portrayal - regulators of high technologies face an inevitable epistemic barrier when making technological assessments, which forces them to delegate technical questions to people with more tacit knowledge, and hence to 'regulate' at a distance by evaluating 'trust' rather than 'technology'. It then unravels some of the implications of this and its relation to our theories of regulation and 'regulatory capture'.
本文通过考察美国联邦航空管理局(FAA)的“型号认证”流程,研究了高科技监管中“专业知识”带来的困境。该流程用于评估民用飞机的新设计。本文观察到,FAA 将大量工作委托给制造商,并且从科学技术社会学的角度探讨了 FAA 这样做的原因。本文认为,与普遍看法相反,高科技监管者在进行技术评估时,必然会面临知识上的障碍,这迫使他们将技术问题委托给具有更多隐性知识的人,从而通过评估“信任”而不是“技术”,实现远距离“监管”。然后,本文揭示了这一现象的一些影响及其与我们的监管和“监管俘获”理论的关系。