Roden Gregory J
Issues Law Med. 2010 Spring;25(3):185-273.
In Roe v. Wade, the state of Texas argued that "the fetus is a 'person' within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." To which Justice Harry Blackmun responded, "If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment." However, Justice Blackmun then came to the conclusion "that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." In this article, it is argued that unborn children are indeed "persons" within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. As there is no constitutional text explicitly holding unborn children to be, or not to be, "persons," this argument will be based on the "historical understanding and practice, the structure of the Constitution, and thejurisprudence of [the Supreme] Court." Specifically, it is argued that the Constitution does not confer upon the federal government a specifically enumerated power to grant or deny "personhood" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the power to recognize or deny unborn children as the holders of rights and duties has been historically exercised by the states. The Roe opinion and other Supreme Court cases implicitly recognize this function of state sovereignty. The states did exercise this power and held unborn children to be persons under the property, tort, and criminal law of the several states at the time Roe was decided. As an effect of the unanimity of the states in holding unborn children to be persons under criminal, tort, and property law, the text of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels federal protection of unborn persons. Furthermore, to the extent Justice Blackmun examined the substantive law in these disciplines, his findings are clearly erroneous and as a whole amount to judicial error. Moreover, as a matter of procedure, according to the due process standards recognized in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, Roe v. Wade should be held null and void as to the rights and interests of unborn persons.
在罗诉韦德案中，得克萨斯州辩称，“胎儿是第十四修正案文字及意义上的‘人’”。大法官哈里·布莱克门回应称：“如果这种关于人的认定成立，上诉人的案子当然就不成立了，因为胎儿的生命权届时将由该修正案明确保障。”然而，布莱克门大法官随后得出结论：“第十四修正案中使用的‘人’一词不包括未出生者。”本文认为，未出生儿童在第十四和第五修正案的文字及意义上确实是“人”。由于宪法文本没有明确认定未出生儿童是或不是“人”，这一论点将基于“历史理解与实践、宪法结构以及[最高法院的]判例法”。具体而言，本文认为宪法并未赋予联邦政府一项明确列举的权力，以根据第十四修正案授予或剥夺“人的身份”。相反，承认或否认未出生儿童为权利和义务主体的权力，历史上一直由各州行使。罗诉韦德案的判决意见及最高法院的其他判例含蓄地承认了州主权的这一职能。在罗诉韦德案判决之时，各州确实行使了这一权力，并根据各州的财产法、侵权法和刑法认定未出生儿童为人。由于各州一致认定未出生儿童在刑法、侵权法和财产法下为人，第十四修正案平等保护条款的文本迫使联邦政府对未出生者提供保护。此外，就布莱克门大法官对这些学科实体法的审查而言，他的结论明显错误，总体上构成司法错误。而且，在程序方面，根据最高法院第五修正案判例法所认可的正当程序标准，罗诉韦德案关于未出生者权益的判决应被判定无效。
