Weinert Friedel
Department of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Bradford, Richmond Road, Bradford BD7 IDP, UK.
Stud Hist Philos Sci. 2010 Mar;41(1):95-104. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.12.003.
The paper examines Wesley Salmon's claim that the primary role of plausibility arguments in the history of science is to impose constraints on the prior probability of hypotheses (in the language of Bayesian confirmation theory). A detailed look at Copernicanism and Darwinism and, more briefly, Rutherford's discovery of the atomic nucleus reveals a further and arguably more important role of plausibility arguments. It resides in the consideration of likelihoods, which state how likely a given hypothesis makes a given piece of evidence. In each case the likelihoods raise the probability of one of the competing hypotheses and diminish the credibility of its rival, and this may happen either on the basis of 'old' or 'new' evidence.
本文考察了韦斯利·萨蒙的观点,即似真性论证在科学史上的主要作用是对假设的先验概率施加限制(用贝叶斯确证理论的语言来说)。对哥白尼主义和达尔文主义进行详细考察,更简要地说,对卢瑟福发现原子核的考察表明,似真性论证还有一个进一步的、且可以说更重要的作用。它在于对似然性的考量,似然性说明了给定假设产生给定证据的可能性。在每种情况下,似然性都会提高其中一个竞争假设的概率,并降低其对手的可信度,而这可能基于“旧”证据或“新”证据而发生。