Department of Philosophy, George Washington University, Phillips 525, 801 22nd Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20052, USA.
Theor Med Bioeth. 2010 Aug;31(4):317-31. doi: 10.1007/s11017-010-9152-y.
Might it be morally wrong to procreate? David Benatar answers affirmatively in Better Never to Have Been, arguing that coming into existence is always a great harm. I counter this view in several ways. First, I argue against Benatar's asserted asymmetry between harm and benefit--which would support the claim that any amount of harm in a human life would make it not worth starting--while questioning the significance of his distinction between a life worth starting and one worth continuing. I further contend that his understanding of hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories distorts their implications for the quality of human life; as for objective-list theories, I rebut his critique of their human-centered basis of evaluation. Notwithstanding this multi-tiered challenge to Benatar's reasoning, I conclude with praise for his work and the intellectual virtues it embodies.
生育是否在道德上是错误的？大卫·本纳特在《最好从未存在过》一书中肯定地回答了这个问题，他认为存在本身总是一种巨大的伤害。我从几个方面反驳了这种观点。首先，我反对本纳特所主张的伤害和利益之间的不对称性——这种不对称性支持了这样一种观点，即人类生命中的任何伤害都会使其不值得开始——同时质疑他在值得开始的生命和值得延续的生命之间的区别的重要性。我进一步认为，他对快乐主义和欲望满足理论的理解扭曲了它们对人类生活质量的影响；至于客观清单理论，我反驳了他对其以人为中心的评价基础的批评。尽管对本纳特的推理提出了多层次的挑战，但我还是对他的工作及其所体现的智力美德表示赞赏。
