Doyal Len
Queen Mary, University of London, 708 Willoughby House, The Barbican, London EC2Y 8BN, UK.
J Med Ethics. 2007 Oct;33(10):573-6. doi: 10.1136/jme.2006.020156.
Benatar argues that it is better never to have been born because of the harms always associated with human existence. Non-existence entails no harm, along with no experience of the absence of any benefits that existence might offer. Therefore, he maintains that procreation is morally irresponsible, along with the use of reproductive technology to have children. Women should seek termination if they become pregnant and it would be better for potential future generations if humans become extinct as soon as humanely possible. These views are challenged by the argument that while decisions not to procreate may be rational on the grounds of the harm that might occur, it may equally rational to gamble under certain circumstances that future children would be better-off experiencing the harms and benefits of life rather than never having the opportunity of experiencing anything. To the degree that Benatar's arguments preclude the potential rationality of any such gamble, their moral relevance to concrete issues concerning human reproduction is weakened. However, he is right to emphasise the importance of foreseen harm when decisions are made to attempt to have children.
贝纳塔尔认为，由于人类生存总是伴随着各种伤害，所以从未出生更好。不存在意味着没有伤害，也没有对存在可能带来的任何益处缺失的体验。因此，他坚持认为生育在道德上是不负责任的，使用生殖技术生育孩子也是如此。如果女性怀孕，她们应该寻求终止妊娠；如果人类尽快人道地灭绝，对未来潜在的几代人会更好。这些观点受到了如下观点的挑战：虽然基于可能发生的伤害而决定不生育可能是理性的，但在某些情况下，赌未来的孩子经历生活的伤害和益处会比根本没有体验任何事情的机会过得更好，同样可能是理性的。就贝纳塔尔的论点排除了任何此类赌博的潜在合理性而言，它们与有关人类生殖的具体问题的道德相关性被削弱了。然而，他强调在做出尝试生育的决定时预见伤害的重要性是正确的。
