Institute for Empirical Economics, University of Zürich, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2010 Oct 19;107(42):17927-32. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1012115107. Epub 2010 Oct 4.
Ending violent international conflicts requires understanding the causal factors that perpetuate them. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israelis and Palestinians each tend to see themselves as victims, engaging in violence only in response to attacks initiated by a fundamentally and implacably violent foe bent on their destruction. Econometric techniques allow us to empirically test the degree to which violence on each side occurs in response to aggression by the other side. Prior studies using these methods have argued that Israel reacts strongly to attacks by Palestinians, whereas Palestinian violence is random (i.e., not predicted by prior Israeli attacks). Here we replicate prior findings that Israeli killings of Palestinians increase after Palestinian killings of Israelis, but crucially show further that when nonlethal forms of violence are considered, and when a larger dataset is used, Palestinian violence also reveals a pattern of retaliation: (i) the firing of Palestinian rockets increases sharply after Israelis kill Palestinians, and (ii) the probability (although not the number) of killings of Israelis by Palestinians increases after killings of Palestinians by Israel. These findings suggest that Israeli military actions against Palestinians lead to escalation rather than incapacitation. Further, they refute the view that Palestinians are uncontingently violent, showing instead that a significant proportion of Palestinian violence occurs in response to Israeli behavior. Well-established cognitive biases may lead participants on each side of the conflict to underappreciate the degree to which the other side's violence is retaliatory, and hence to systematically underestimate their own role in perpetuating the conflict.
结束国际暴力冲突需要了解使冲突持续的因果因素。在以色列-巴勒斯坦冲突中,以色列人和巴勒斯坦人都倾向于将自己视为受害者,仅在受到另一方发起的、旨在摧毁他们的根本和无情暴力攻击时才会采取暴力行为。计量经济学技术使我们能够根据双方之间的暴力程度来检验对方的侵略程度。先前使用这些方法的研究认为,以色列对巴勒斯坦人的攻击反应强烈,而巴勒斯坦人的暴力行为是随机的(即,不是由先前的以色列攻击所预测的)。在这里,我们复制了先前的发现,即巴勒斯坦人杀害以色列人后,以色列人对巴勒斯坦人的杀害会增加,但至关重要的是,进一步表明,当考虑到非致命形式的暴力行为,并且使用更大的数据集时,巴勒斯坦人的暴力行为也显示出报复模式:(i)以色列人杀害巴勒斯坦人后,巴勒斯坦人发射火箭的数量急剧增加,(ii)以色列人杀害巴勒斯坦人后,巴勒斯坦人杀害以色列人的概率(尽管不是数量)增加。这些发现表明,以色列对巴勒斯坦人的军事行动导致了升级,而不是削弱。此外,它们反驳了巴勒斯坦人是不可控制的暴力行为的观点,表明相当一部分巴勒斯坦人的暴力行为是对以色列行为的回应。已确立的认知偏见可能导致冲突双方的参与者低估对方暴力行为是报复性的程度,从而系统地低估自己在使冲突持续方面的作用。