CNRS - New York University, Department of Philosophy, 5 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003, USA.
Conscious Cogn. 2011 Mar;20(1):82-93. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.004. Epub 2010 Oct 12.
There are two main pathways to investigate the sense of body ownership, (i) through the study of the conditions of embodiment for an object to be experienced as one's own and (ii) through the analysis of the deficits in patients who experience a body part as alien. Here, I propose that E is embodied if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the properties of one's body. However, one must distinguish among different types of embodiment, and only self-specific embodiment can lead to feelings of ownership. I address issues such as the functional role and the dynamics of embodiment, degrees and measures of ownership, and shared body representations between self and others. I then analyse the interaction between ownership and disownership. On the one hand, I show that there is no evidence that in the Rubber Hand Illusion, the rubber hand replaces the biological hand. On the other hand, I argue that the sense of disownership experienced by patients towards their body part cannot be reduced to the mere lack of ownership.
有两种主要的途径来研究身体所有权的感觉，（i）通过研究一个物体被体验为自己的身体的条件，（ii）通过分析那些将身体的一部分体验为异物的患者的缺陷。在这里，我提出，如果 E 的某些属性以与自己身体的属性相同的方式被处理，那么 E 就是被体现的。然而，人们必须区分不同类型的体现，只有自我特异性的体现才能导致所有权的感觉。我解决了一些问题，例如体现的功能作用和动态、所有权的程度和度量、自我和他人之间的共享身体表示。然后，我分析了所有权和否认所有权之间的相互作用。一方面，我表明，在橡胶手错觉中，橡胶手并没有取代生物手，没有证据表明这一点。另一方面，我认为，患者对自己身体部分的否认感不能仅仅归结为缺乏所有权。
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