Department of Philosophy, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA.
Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 2011 Oct;35(9):2036-44. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.10.010. Epub 2010 Oct 23.
The philosophical implications of Jaak Panksepp's affective neuroscience comprise a significant form of skepticism regarding our capacities as agents. This is clear in two ways. (1) Panksepp's methods of inquiry support a corollary to Dobzhansky's famous maxim concerning evolution: nothing in mammalian psychology makes sense except in light of ancient affective capacities shared by all mammals. The application of this maxim, I argue, raises informed doubts concerning our knowledge of our own capacities. (2) Against the backdrop of this maxim, Panksepp's substantive discoveries provide tentative confirmation of theories in psychology which raise doubts about our alleged capacity to give reasons for our actions. Taken together, Panksepp's methods and discoveries call into question the view we have of ourselves as free and responsible agents, while pointing us toward more-fruitful forms of inquiry concerning all our animal capacities, including our capacities for deliberation, choice, and action.
贾克·潘克塞普情感神经科学的哲学意蕴包含了一种对我们作为行动者的能力的重要形式的怀疑主义。这可以从两个方面看清楚。(1) 潘克塞普的探究方法支持多布赞斯基(Dobzhansky)著名格言的一个推论，即哺乳动物心理学中的任何东西，如果不考虑所有哺乳动物都具有的古老情感能力，就没有任何意义。我认为，这条格言的应用对我们自己能力的认识提出了明智的怀疑。(2) 在这条格言的背景下，潘克塞普的实质性发现为心理学中的一些理论提供了初步证实，这些理论对我们所谓的为自己的行为提供理由的能力提出了质疑。总的来说，潘克塞普的方法和发现对我们作为自由和负责任的行动者的观点提出了质疑，同时也为我们探究所有动物能力，包括我们的思考、选择和行动能力，提供了更有成效的形式。
