Department of Philosophy, University of Aarhus, Denmark.
J Med Ethics. 2011 Feb;37(2):81-3; discussion 123-5. doi: 10.1136/jme.2010.037275. Epub 2010 Oct 28.
It has recently been suggested by Shaw (2007) that the distinction between voluntary active euthanasia, such as giving a patient a lethal overdose with the intention of ending that patient's life, and voluntary passive euthanasia, such as removing a patient from a ventilator, is much less obvious than is commonly acknowledged in the literature. This is argued by suggesting a new perspective that more accurately reflects the moral features of end-of-life situations. The argument is simply that if we consider the body of a mentally competent patient who wants to die, a kind of 'unwarranted' life support, then the distinction collapses. We argue that all Shaw has provided is a perspective that makes the conclusion that there is little distinction between voluntary active euthanasia and voluntary passive euthanasia only seemingly more palatable. In doing so he has yet to convince us that this perspective is superior to other perspectives and thus more accurately reflects the moral features of the situations pertaining to this issue.
肖(2007)最近提出,自愿积极安乐死(如给病人过量致命药物以结束其生命)和自愿消极安乐死(如从呼吸机上撤下病人)之间的区别并不像文献中普遍承认的那样明显。他通过提出一个新的视角来论证这一点,这个视角更准确地反映了生命末期情况的道德特征。这个论点很简单,如果我们考虑一个有意愿死亡的心智健全的病人的身体,一种“不必要的”生命支持,那么这种区别就消失了。我们认为,肖所提供的只是一种视角,使自愿积极安乐死和自愿消极安乐死之间几乎没有区别的结论看起来更容易接受。这样做,他还没有说服我们,这种视角优于其他视角,因此更准确地反映了与这一问题相关的情况的道德特征。