Wakiyama Motoya, Tanimoto Jun
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka, Japan.
Biosystems. 2011 Jan;103(1):93-104. doi: 10.1016/j.biosystems.2010.10.009. Epub 2010 Oct 28.
This paper numerically investigates 2×2 games involving the Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, Hero, Leader, Stag Hunt, and Trivial Games in which agents have a strategy expressed by five-bit, two-memory length. Our motivation is to explore how grouping for game interaction and strategy adaptation influence ST reciprocity and R reciprocity (Tanimoto and Sagara, 2007a [Tanimoto, J., Sagara, H., 2007a. A study on emergence of coordinated alternating reciprocity in a 2×2 game with 2-memory length strategy. Biosystems 90(3), 728-737]. Enhanced R reciprocity is observed with the stronger grouping for game interaction when a relatively stronger grouping for strategy adaptation is assumed. On the other hand, enhanced ST reciprocity emerged with the stronger grouping for strategy adaptation when the relatively weaker grouping for game interaction is imposed. Our numerical experiment deals with those two groupings independently and dependently.
本文对涉及囚徒困境、懦夫博弈、英雄博弈、领导者博弈、猎鹿博弈和简单博弈的2×2博弈进行了数值研究，其中参与者的策略由五位、两个记忆长度来表示。我们的动机是探究博弈交互的分组和策略适应如何影响ST互惠性和R互惠性（谷本和笹原，2007a [谷本，J.，笹原，H.，2007a。关于具有两个记忆长度策略的2×2博弈中协调交替互惠性出现的研究。生物系统90(3)，728 - 737]）。当假定策略适应的分组相对较强时，随着博弈交互的分组越强，观察到增强的R互惠性。另一方面，当博弈交互的分组相对较弱时，随着策略适应的分组越强，出现增强的ST互惠性。我们的数值实验分别独立地和相关地处理这两种分组情况。
