Browning Lindsay, Colman Andrew M
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3UD, UK.
J Theor Biol. 2004 Aug 21;229(4):549-57. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.04.032.
A genetic algorithm incorporating mutation and crossing-over was used to investigate the evolution of social behaviour in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken (Hawk-Dove), Battle of the Sexes, and Leader games. The results show that the strategic structure of an interaction has a crucial determining effect on the type of social behaviour that evolves. In particular, simulations using repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken (Hawk-Dove) games lead to the emergence of genes coding for symmetric reciprocity and the evolution of mutual cooperation, whereas simulations using repeated Battle of the Sexes and Leader games lead to near-fixation of genes coding for asymmetric strategic choices and the evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity. A mechanism is suggested whereby, in games with asymmetric equilibrium points, coordinated alternating reciprocity might evolve without insight or communication between players.
一种结合了变异和交叉的遗传算法被用于研究重复囚徒困境、懦夫博弈（鹰鸽博弈）、性别之战和领导者博弈中社会行为的演变。结果表明，互动的战略结构对所演变的社会行为类型具有关键的决定性作用。具体而言，使用重复囚徒困境和懦夫博弈（鹰鸽博弈）进行的模拟导致编码对称互惠的基因出现以及相互合作的演变，而使用重复性别之战和领导者博弈进行的模拟则导致编码非对称战略选择的基因近乎固定以及协调交替互惠的演变。本文提出了一种机制，据此在具有非对称平衡点的博弈中，协调交替互惠可能在参与者之间没有洞察力或沟通的情况下演变。
