Biomedical Ethics Unit, Faculty of Medicine, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
Bioethics. 2012 Mar;26(3):149-56. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01838.x. Epub 2010 Oct 6.
Over the past several decades the 'affective revolution' in cognitive psychology has emphasized the critical role affect and emotion play in human decision-making. Drawing on this affective literature, various commentators have recently proposed strategies for managing therapeutic expectation that use contextual, symbolic, or emotive interventions in the consent process to convey information or enhance comprehension. In this paper, we examine whether affective consent interventions that target affect and emotion can be reconciled with widely accepted standards for autonomous action. More specifically, the ethics of affective consent interventions is assessed in terms of key elements of autonomy, comprehension and voluntariness. While there may appear to be a moral obligation to manage the affective environment to ensure valid informed consent, in circumstances where volunteers may be prone to problematic therapeutic expectancy, this moral obligation needs to be weighed against the potential risks of human instrumentalization. At this point in time we do not have enough information to be able to justify clearly the programmatic manipulation of human subjects' affective states. The lack of knowledge about affective interventions requires corresponding caution in its ethical justification.
在过去几十年中，认知心理学中的“情感革命”强调了情感和情绪在人类决策中的关键作用。基于这种情感文献，最近有各种评论员提出了管理治疗期望的策略，即在同意过程中使用上下文、符号或情感干预来传达信息或增强理解。在本文中，我们研究了针对情感和情绪的情感同意干预措施是否可以与广泛接受的自主行动标准相协调。更具体地说，从自主性、理解和自愿性的关键要素来评估情感同意干预措施的伦理问题。虽然似乎有道德义务来管理情感环境以确保有效的知情同意，但在志愿者可能容易产生有问题的治疗期望的情况下，这种道德义务需要与潜在的人类工具化风险相权衡。在这个时间点，我们没有足够的信息来明确证明对人类受试者的情感状态进行有计划的操纵是合理的。缺乏关于情感干预的知识需要在其伦理证明方面相应地谨慎。
