Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, Germany.
Psychopathology. 2011;44(1):46-52. doi: 10.1159/000317777. Epub 2010 Nov 2.
This article suggests that an account of pretence based on the idea of shared intentionality can be of help in understanding autism. In autism, there seems to be a strong link between being able to engage in pretend play, understanding the minds of others and having adequate access to own mental states. Since one of the first behavioral manifestations of autism is the lack of pretend play, it therefore seems natural to investigate pretence in order to identify the nature of the central impairment in question. In mainstream theories, this has been identified as an impaired 'theory of mind module' or 'mentalizing' capacities. This paper points to some difficulties encountered by such accounts and - by drawing on research by Tomasello and Rakoczy - seeks to develop an alternative account of pretence and social cognition.
本文提出，基于共享意向性概念的假装理论可以帮助我们理解自闭症。在自闭症中，能够进行假装游戏、理解他人的心理以及充分了解自己的心理状态之间似乎存在着很强的联系。由于自闭症的最早行为表现之一是缺乏假装游戏，因此，为了确定核心障碍的性质，研究假装行为似乎是很自然的。在主流理论中，这被确定为受损的“心理理论模块”或“心理化”能力。本文指出了这些解释所遇到的一些困难，并通过借鉴托马塞洛和拉科奇的研究，试图提出一种假装和社会认知的替代解释。
