Universitätsfrauenklinik Würzburg, Josef-Schneider-Str. 4, 97080 Würzburg, Germany.
Reprod Biomed Online. 2010 Dec;21(7):830-3. doi: 10.1016/j.rbmo.2010.07.003. Epub 2010 Jul 18.
This article applies the moral sentimentalism founded by David Hume to the moral status of the embryo. It will attempt to explain the paradoxical fact that in Germany abortion is common and socially accepted while preimplantation genetic diagnosis is banned with the aid of an approach based on moral sentimentalism. David Hume established the thesis that the human being is guided by the emotions and not by reason when making moral decisions. Scientific innovations often create a feeling of anxiety. Consequently, the initial moral judgment about it is negative. Due to this habit, the innovation is often accepted after a phase of indifference. This phenomenon has been observed in the case of heart transplantation, as well as for IVF. Consequently, the apparent contradiction in the varying degrees of the embryo's worthiness of protection in the womb and in the Petri dish is due to the simple fact that these are different stages of habituation. Therefore, the ethics of Hume cannot stipulate the embryo's moral status for once and for all; however, they can paradoxically raise the ongoing current debate to a more rational level through the insight that the underlying moral concepts are not based on reason alone.
本文将大卫·休谟的道德情感主义应用于胚胎的道德地位。它将尝试借助基于道德情感主义的方法，解释德国堕胎普遍且被社会接受，而胚胎植入前基因诊断却被禁止这一自相矛盾的事实。大卫·休谟提出了这样一个论点，即人类在做出道德决策时是受情感而非理性指导的。科学创新往往会引发焦虑感。因此，人们最初对它的道德判断是负面的。由于这种习惯，在经历了一段时间的漠不关心之后，创新往往会被接受。这种现象在心脏移植和体外受精中都有观察到。因此，子宫内和培养皿中胚胎保护价值的不同程度之间明显的矛盾，仅仅是因为这些是不同的习惯阶段。因此，休谟的伦理学不能一劳永逸地规定胚胎的道德地位；然而，通过认识到潜在的道德概念不仅仅基于理性，它们可以通过将正在进行的当前辩论提升到更理性的水平而引起争议。
