Wellcome Laboratory of Neurobiology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, UK.
Brain. 2011 Jan;134(Pt 1):247-57. doi: 10.1093/brain/awq305. Epub 2010 Nov 19.
A compelling single case report of visual awareness (visual qualia) without primary visual cortex would be sufficient to refute the hypothesis that the primary visual cortex and the back-projections to it are necessary for conscious visual experience. In a previous study, we emphasized the presence of crude visual awareness in Patient G.Y., with a lesion of the primary visual cortex, who is aware of, and able to discriminate, fast-moving visual stimuli presented to his blind field. The visual nature of Patient G.Y.'s blind field experience has since been questioned and it has been suggested that the special circumstances of repeated testing over decades may have altered Patient G.Y.'s visual pathways. We therefore sought new evidence of visual awareness without primary visual cortex in patients for whom such considerations do not apply. Three patients with hemianopic field defects (Patient G.N. and Patient F.B. with MRI confirmed primary visual cortex lesions, Patient C.G. with an inferred lesion) underwent detailed psychophysical testing in their blind fields. Visual stimuli were presented at different velocities and contrasts in two- and four-direction discrimination experiments and the direction of motion and awareness reported using a forced-choice paradigm. Detailed verbal reports were also obtained of the nature of the blind field experience with comparison of the drawings of the stimulus presented in the blind and intact fields, where possible. All three patients reported visual awareness in their blind fields. Visual awareness was significantly more likely when a moving stimulus was present compared to no stimulus catch trials (P < 0.01 for each subject). Psychophysical performance in Patient F.B. and Patient G.N. was consistent with the Riddoch syndrome, with higher levels of visual awareness for moving compared to static stimuli (P < 0.001) and intact direction discrimination (P < 0.0001 for two- and four-direction experiments). Although the blind field experience of all three subjects was degraded, it was clearly visual in nature. We conclude that the primary visual cortex or back-projections to it are not necessary for visual awareness.
如果有一个引人注目的单一病例报告表明,即使没有初级视觉皮层,个体仍然具有视觉意识(视觉表象),那么这就足以反驳初级视觉皮层及其向其的反向投射对于意识视觉体验是必要的这一假设。在之前的研究中,我们强调了患者 G.Y.的初级视觉皮层受损,但仍具有粗糙的视觉意识,他能够意识到并区分快速移动的视觉刺激,尽管这些刺激出现在他的盲区。此后,患者 G.Y.的盲区体验的视觉性质受到了质疑,有人认为,经过几十年的反复测试的特殊情况可能改变了患者 G.Y.的视觉通路。因此,我们在那些没有这种考虑因素的患者中寻找没有初级视觉皮层的视觉意识的新证据。三名具有偏盲视野缺陷的患者(患者 G.N.和患者 F.B.的 MRI 确认了初级视觉皮层损伤,患者 C.G.推测有损伤)在其盲区接受了详细的心理物理学测试。在二向和四向辨别实验中,以不同的速度和对比度呈现视觉刺激,并使用强制选择范式报告运动方向和意识。还详细记录了他们的盲区体验,并尽可能将盲区内呈现的刺激的绘图与完整视野内的刺激绘图进行比较。所有三名患者均报告在其盲区中具有视觉意识。当存在移动刺激时,与无刺激的捕捉试验相比,视觉意识更有可能(每个患者的 P 值均<0.01)。患者 F.B.和患者 G.N.的心理物理学表现与 Riddoch 综合征一致,与静态刺激相比,移动刺激的视觉意识更高(二向和四向实验的 P 值均<0.001),并且具有完整的方向辨别能力(P 值均<0.0001)。尽管所有三名患者的盲区体验都有所下降,但它们显然具有视觉性质。我们得出的结论是,初级视觉皮层或向其的反向投射对于视觉意识并非必需。