Card Robert F
Department of Philosophy, State University of New York at Oswego, Oswego, USA.
J Med Philos. 2011 Feb;36(1):53-68. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhq062. Epub 2011 Jan 17.
Defenders of medical professionals' rights to conscientious objection (CO) regarding emergency contraception (EC) draw an analogy to CO in the military. Such professionals object to EC since it has the possibility of harming zygotic life, yet if we accept this analogy and utilize jurisprudence to frame the associated public policy, those who refuse to dispense EC would not have their objection honored. Legal precedent holds that one must consistently object to all forms of the relevant activity. In the case at hand, then, I argue that these professionals must also oppose morally innocuous practices that may prevent pregnancy after fertilization. These results reveal that such objectors cannot offer a plausible and consistent objection to harming zygotic life. Additionally, there are good reasons to reject the analogy itself. In either case, these findings call into question the case supporting refusals of EC based on scruples.
维护医疗专业人员在紧急避孕（EC）方面依良心拒行（CO）权利的人将其与军队中的依良心拒行进行类比。这类专业人员反对紧急避孕，因为它有可能伤害受精卵生命，然而，如果我们接受这种类比并运用法理学来构建相关公共政策，那些拒绝发放紧急避孕药的人的反对将不会得到尊重。法律先例表明，一个人必须始终反对所有形式的相关活动。那么，就目前的情况而言，我认为这些专业人员还必须反对那些可能在受精后防止怀孕的道德无害做法。这些结果表明，此类反对者无法对伤害受精卵生命提出合理且一致的反对意见。此外，有充分理由拒绝这种类比本身。无论哪种情况，这些发现都对基于顾虑而拒绝紧急避孕的理由提出了质疑。
