Tofan I A, Crumpei Irina
Catedra de Istoria filosofiei şi hermeneutică, Facultatea de Filosofie şi Stiinte Social-Politice, Universitatea AI.I. Cuza Iaşi.
Rev Med Chir Soc Med Nat Iasi. 2010 Jul-Sep;114(3):943-52.
This paper concerns a general theoretical aspect, followed by different examples which discusses the thesis in relation to major connected domains of research: psychology and philosophy. The thesis which we are arguing for is that the body represents a source of significance in the definitions of he self used as theoretical background in moral problems (philosophical aspect) and the explanations of the way the image of the self is constituted (psychological aspect). The philosophical "conclusion" is that the body, in its materiality, cannot be judged by the metaphysical dualism scheme, which assigns it a secondary role in the hierarchy of categories. From a psychological point of view, this paper tends to show that the body does not represent an accident of personality or a "prison of the soul" as Plato refers to it, but rather an element through which personality is built on and develops and similarly, the mental and personality structures are those which allow the forming of corporeality and then the person's reference to it.
本文关注一个一般性的理论层面,随后给出不同的例子,这些例子探讨了与主要相关研究领域(心理学和哲学)相关的论题。我们所主张的论题是,身体在道德问题(哲学层面)的理论背景中自我定义以及自我形象构成方式的解释(心理学层面)中,代表着一种意义来源。哲学上的“结论”是,身体在其物质性方面,不能用形而上学二元论的模式来评判,该模式在范畴等级中赋予它次要地位。从心理学角度看,本文倾向于表明,身体并非如柏拉图所指的是人格的偶然因素或“灵魂的监狱”,而是人格得以建立和发展所凭借的一个要素,同样,心理和人格结构是那些使得物质性得以形成并进而使个体能够参照它的结构。