Nobis Nathan
Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA 30030, USA.
J Med Philos. 2011 Jun;36(3):261-73. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhr015. Epub 2011 May 19.
In Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice (2007) and an earlier article in this journal, "Defending Abortion Philosophically"(2006), Francis Beckwith argues that fetuses are, from conception, prima facie wrong to kill. His arguments are based on what he calls a "metaphysics of the human person" known as "The Substance View." I argue that Beckwith's metaphysics does not support his abortion ethic: Moral, not metaphysical, claims that are part of this Substance View are the foundation of the argument, and Beckwith inadequately defends these moral claims. Thus, Beckwith's arguments do not provide strong support for what he calls the "pro-life" view of abortion.
在《捍卫生命：反对堕胎选择的道德与法律理由》（2007年）以及发表于本期刊的一篇更早的文章《从哲学角度捍卫堕胎》（2006年）中，弗朗西斯·贝克威斯认为，从受孕之时起，杀死胎儿初步看来就是错误的。他的论证基于他所谓的一种名为“实体观”的“关于人的形而上学”。我认为贝克威斯的形而上学并不支持他的堕胎伦理观：作为这种实体观一部分的道德主张而非形而上学主张才是该论证的基础，并且贝克威斯对这些道德主张的辩护并不充分。因此，贝克威斯的论证并未为他所谓的堕胎“生命权”观点提供有力支持。
