Computing and Information Technology, Griffith University, Australia.
Cogn Sci. 2005 Jan 2;29(1):135-43. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6.
One of the arguments for active externalism (also known as the extended mind thesis) is that if a process counts as cognitive when it is performed in the head, it should also count as cognitive when it is performed in the world. Consequently, mind extends into the world. I argue for a corollary: We sometimes perform actions in our heads that we usually perform in the world, so that the world leaks into the mind. I call this internalism. Internalism has epistemological implications: If a process gives us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the world, it will also give us an empirical discovery when it is performed in the head. I look at a simple example that highlights this implication. I then explore the relation between internalism and active externalism in more detail and conclude by comparing internalism with mental modeling.
有一种观点认为外部活动主义（也称为扩展心灵论点）是合理的，如果一个过程在大脑中进行时被视为认知过程，那么当它在世界中进行时也应该被视为认知过程。因此，心灵延伸到了世界中。我提出了一个推论：我们有时在大脑中执行我们通常在世界中执行的行动，因此世界会渗透到头脑中。我称之为内在主义。内在主义具有认识论上的含义：如果一个过程在世界中进行时为我们提供了经验发现，那么当它在头脑中进行时也会为我们提供经验发现。我看了一个简单的例子，突出了这一含义。然后，我更详细地探讨了内在主义和积极的外部主义之间的关系，并通过将内在主义与心理模型进行比较来得出结论。
