van der Weele Cor
LEI, Wageningen University and Research Centre, The Hague, The Netherlands.
Biol Philos. 2011 Jul;26(4):583-593. doi: 10.1007/s10539-011-9248-4. Epub 2011 Mar 11.
Frans de Waal's view that empathy is at the basis of morality directly seems to build on Darwin, who considered sympathy as the crucial instinct. Yet when we look closer, their understanding of the central social instinct differs considerably. De Waal sees our deeply ingrained tendency to sympathize (or rather: empathize) with others as the good side of our morally dualistic nature. For Darwin, sympathizing was not the whole story of the "workings of sympathy"; the (selfish) need to receive sympathy played just as central a role in the complex roads from sympathy to morality. Darwin's understanding of sympathy stems from Adam Smith, who argued that the presence of morally impure motives should not be a reason for cynicism about morality. I suggest that De Waal's approach could benefit from a more thorough alignment with the analysis of the workings of sympathy in the work of Darwin and Adam Smith.
弗兰斯·德瓦尔认为共情是道德的基础，这一观点似乎直接建立在达尔文的基础之上，达尔文将同情视为关键本能。然而，当我们仔细审视时，他们对核心社会本能的理解存在相当大的差异。德瓦尔将我们根深蒂固的同情（或者更确切地说：共情）他人的倾向视为我们道德二元性本质的积极一面。对达尔文来说，同情并非“同情的运作”的全部；在从同情到道德的复杂过程中，（自私的）获得同情的需求同样起着核心作用。达尔文对同情的理解源于亚当·斯密，亚当·斯密认为道德不纯动机的存在不应成为对道德持愤世嫉俗态度的理由。我认为，德瓦尔的方法可以从更全面地与达尔文和亚当·斯密著作中对同情运作的分析保持一致中受益。
