Department of Medical Humanities and the EMGO+ Institute for Health and Care Research, VU University Medical Centre, Amsterdam.
Bioethics. 2011 Sep;25(7):383-93. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2011.01914.x.
In clinical moral decision making, emotions often play an important role. However, many clinical ethicists are ignorant, suspicious or even critical of the role of emotions in making moral decisions and in reflecting on them. This raises practical and theoretical questions about the understanding and use of emotions in clinical ethics support services. This paper presents an Aristotelian view on emotions and describes its application in the practice of moral case deliberation. According to Aristotle, emotions are an original and integral part of (virtue) ethics. Emotions are an inherent part of our moral reasoning and being, and therefore they should be an inherent part of any moral deliberation. Based on Aristotle's view, we examine five specific aspects of emotions: the description of emotions, the attitude towards emotions, the thoughts present in emotions, the reliability of emotions, and the reasonable principle that guides an emotion. We then discuss three ways of dealing with emotions in the process of moral case deliberation. Finally, we present an Aristotelian conversation method, and present practical experiences using this method.
在临床道德决策中，情感常常起着重要的作用。然而，许多临床伦理学家对情感在道德决策及其反思中的作用持忽视、怀疑甚至批评的态度。这就提出了关于在临床伦理支持服务中理解和使用情感的实际和理论问题。本文介绍了亚里士多德关于情感的观点，并描述了其在道德案例审议实践中的应用。根据亚里士多德的观点，情感是（美德）伦理学的原始和不可或缺的组成部分。情感是我们道德推理和存在的固有部分，因此它们应该是任何道德审议的固有部分。基于亚里士多德的观点，我们考察了情感的五个具体方面：情感的描述、对情感的态度、情感中存在的思想、情感的可靠性以及指导情感的合理原则。然后，我们讨论了在道德案例审议过程中处理情感的三种方式。最后，我们提出了一种亚里士多德对话方法，并介绍了使用这种方法的实际经验。
