Department of Philosophy and Center for Ethics and Humanities in Life Science, Michigan State University, 324 Linton Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA.
Theor Med Bioeth. 2011 Oct;32(5):289-300. doi: 10.1007/s11017-011-9192-y.
Most people accept that if they can save someone from death at very little cost to themselves, they must do so; call this the 'duty of easy rescue.' At least for many such people, an instance of this duty is to allow their vital organs to be used for transplantation. Accordingly, 'opt-out' organ procurement policies, based on a powerfully motivated responsibility to render costless or very low-cost lifesaving aid, would seem presumptively permissible. Counterarguments abound. Here I consider, in particular, objections that assign a moral distinctiveness to the physical boundaries of our bodies and that concern autonomy and trust. These objections are singled out as they seem particularly pertinent to the stress I place on a distinctive benefit of the particular policy I defend. An opt-out system, resting not on the authority of 'presumed consent' but on the recognition of a duty to one another, has the prospect of prompting people to understand more richly the ways in which they are both physically embodied and communally embedded.
大多数人都认为，如果他们可以不费吹灰之力挽救他人的生命，他们就必须这样做；这就是所谓的“轻松救援义务”。至少对于许多这样的人来说，他们的责任之一就是允许他们的重要器官被用于移植。因此，基于向他人提供无成本或低成本的救生援助的强烈动机责任，“默认同意”的器官获取政策似乎是可以预先假定的。然而，反对的声音也不绝于耳。在这里，我特别考虑了那些将身体的物理边界赋予道德独特性的观点，以及那些关注自主权和信任的观点。这些反对意见被单独挑出来，因为它们似乎特别符合我所强调的、我所捍卫的特定政策的独特益处。一个基于相互义务而不是“默认同意”的默认同意系统，有可能促使人们更深入地理解他们的身体和社区的联系。
