Department of Philosophy, George Washington University, 801 22nd Street N.W., Washington, DC 20052, USA.
J Med Ethics. 2012 Mar;38(3):135-9. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2011-100126. Epub 2011 Nov 10.
Responding to several leading ideas from a paper by Allen Buchanan, the present essay explores the implications of genetic enhancement for moral status. Contrary to doubts expressed by Buchanan, I argue that genetic enhancement could lead to the existence of beings so superior to contemporary human beings that we might aptly describe them as post-persons. If such post-persons emerged, how should we understand their moral status in relation to ours? The answer depends in part on which of two general models of moral status--one based on respect and one based on interests--is more adequate. Buchanan tentatively argues that a respect-based model is preferable. I challenge Buchanan's view, along these lines: If we embrace a respect-based model of moral status featuring a threshold that divides persons, who are thought to have full and equal moral status, from sentient nonpersons, thought to have less moral status, then we should acknowledge a second threshold and a level of moral status higher than ours. A better option, I tentatively suggest, is to drop the idea of levels of moral status, accept that all sentient beings have moral status, and allow that some differences in interests and capacities justify some significant differences in how we should treat beings of different kinds.
回应艾伦·布坎南（Allen Buchanan）一篇论文中的几个主要观点，本文探讨了基因增强对道德地位的影响。与布坎南所表达的疑虑相反，我认为，基因增强可能会导致出现比当代人类更优越的存在，我们可以恰当地将他们描述为后人类。如果出现这样的后人类，我们应该如何理解他们与我们的道德地位之间的关系？答案部分取决于两种道德地位模式中的哪一种更合适——一种基于尊重，另一种基于利益。布坎南暂时认为，基于尊重的模式更可取。我沿着这些思路对布坎南的观点提出质疑：如果我们接受基于尊重的道德地位模式，其特征是存在一个划分人与非人的门槛，前者被认为具有充分和平等的道德地位，而后者被认为具有较低的道德地位，那么我们应该承认存在第二个门槛和比我们更高的道德地位。我暂时提出的一个更好的选择是放弃道德地位层次的概念，承认所有有感知的生物都具有道德地位，并承认利益和能力的一些差异，从而证明我们应该以不同的方式对待不同种类的生物。
