Aeronautics & Astronautics Department, Stanford University, Durand Building, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
Sensors (Basel). 2010;10(12):11369-89. doi: 10.3390/s101211369. Epub 2010 Dec 13.
Loran is a radio-based navigation system originally designed for naval applications. We show that Loran-C's high-power and high repeatable accuracy are fantastic for security applications. First, we show how to derive a precise location tag--with a sensitivity of about 20 meters--that is difficult to project to an exact location. A device can use our location tag to block or allow certain actions, without knowing its precise location. To ensure that our tag is reproducible we make use of fuzzy extractors, a mechanism originally designed for biometric authentication. We build a fuzzy extractor specifically designed for radio-type errors and give experimental evidence to show its effectiveness. Second, we show that our location tag is difficult to predict from a distance. For example, an observer cannot predict the location tag inside a guarded data center from a few hundreds of meters away. As an application, consider a location-aware disk drive that will only work inside the data center. An attacker who steals the device and is capable of spoofing Loran-C signals, still cannot make the device work since he does not know what location tag to spoof. We provide experimental data supporting our unpredictability claim.
罗兰是一种基于无线电的导航系统,最初设计用于海军应用。我们表明,罗兰 C 的高功率和高度可重复的精度非常适合安全应用。首先,我们展示了如何衍生出一个精确的位置标签——灵敏度约为 20 米——这很难准确地预测到一个确切的位置。设备可以使用我们的位置标签来阻止或允许某些操作,而无需知道其确切位置。为了确保我们的标签是可重复的,我们利用了模糊提取器,这是一种最初为生物识别认证设计的机制。我们专门为无线电类型的错误设计了一个模糊提取器,并给出了实验证据来证明其有效性。其次,我们表明,我们的位置标签很难从远处预测。例如,观察者无法从几百米外预测受保护的数据中心内的位置标签。作为一个应用,考虑一个位置感知的磁盘驱动器,它只能在数据中心内工作。即使攻击者偷了设备并且能够伪造罗兰 C 信号,他也无法使设备工作,因为他不知道要伪造哪个位置标签。我们提供了支持我们不可预测性主张的实验数据。