Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, Center for Health Services and Society, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA.
Cult Med Psychiatry. 2012 Mar;36(1):154-74. doi: 10.1007/s11013-011-9241-z.
The dominance of the neurosciences in psychiatric research raises questions about the relationship between research practices and the lived experience of mental illness. Here, I use data from a group of researchers focusing on neurocognition in schizophrenia to explore the problem of representation in psychiatric research and the forms that neuroscientific evidence assumes for those who produce it. These researchers grappled with the complexity of schizophrenia not by narrowing disease concepts to biological facts but by referencing measurement techniques to generate new versions of schizophrenia. By linking experimental findings to inchoate concepts of personhood and social experience, I found that they reframed and reinforced cultural values, including that those with schizophrenia are destined to a debased and deficient existence. I argue that cognition has emerged as an essential feature of schizophrenia not only because of its representational utility but also because of the ontological work the concept performs. In closing, I present some implications for the neurobiological and social sciences.
神经科学在精神医学研究中的主导地位引发了一些问题,这些问题涉及到研究实践与精神疾病的实际体验之间的关系。在这里,我使用了一组专注于精神分裂症神经认知研究的研究人员的数据,以探讨精神医学研究中代表性的问题,以及神经科学证据对于其产生者所呈现的形式。这些研究人员并没有通过将疾病概念简化为生物学事实来应对精神分裂症的复杂性,而是通过参考测量技术来生成精神分裂症的新版本。通过将实验结果与人格和社会经验的未成形概念联系起来,我发现他们重新构建并强化了文化价值观,包括那些患有精神分裂症的人注定会过上堕落和缺陷的生活。我认为,认知之所以成为精神分裂症的一个基本特征,不仅是因为它具有代表性的实用性,还因为这个概念所发挥的本体论作用。最后,我提出了一些对神经生物学和社会科学的启示。