Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA 92866, USA.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2012 Jan 31;109(5):1425-30. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1115742109. Epub 2012 Jan 17.
The original double auction studies of supply and demand markets established their strong efficiency and equilibrium convergence behavior using economically unsophisticated and untrained subjects. The results were unexpected because all individual costs and values were private and dependent entirely on the market trading process to aggregate the dispersed information into socially desirable outcomes. The exchange environment, however, corresponded to that of perishable, and not re-traded goods in which participants were specialized as buyers or sellers. We report experiments in repeated single-period markets where tradability, and buyer-seller role specialization, is varied by imposing or relaxing a restriction on re-trade within each period. In re-trade markets scope is given to speculative motives unavailable where goods perish on purchase. We observe greatly increased trade volume and decreased efficiency but subject experience increases efficiency. Observed speculation slows convergence by impeding the process whereby individuals learn from the market whether their private circumstances lead them to specialize as buyers or sellers.
原始的供需市场双重拍卖研究使用经济上不复杂和未经训练的主体，确立了其强大的效率和均衡收敛行为。结果出人意料，因为所有的个人成本和价值都是私人的，完全依赖于市场交易过程，将分散的信息汇总成社会期望的结果。然而，交易环境与易腐坏且不可再交易的商品相对应，在这些商品中，参与者专门作为买家或卖家参与交易。我们报告了在重复的单一时期市场中的实验，其中通过在每个时期内对再交易施加或放宽限制来改变可交易性和买卖双方角色专业化。在可再交易市场中，存在购买时商品即消耗掉的情况下无法利用的投机动机。我们观察到交易量大大增加，效率降低，但随着主体经验的增加，效率也会提高。观察到的投机行为通过阻碍个人从市场中了解自己的私人情况是否导致他们专门作为买家或卖家的过程，从而减缓了收敛速度。
