Hobson R P
Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Maudsley Hospital, London, UK.
Br J Med Psychol. 1990 Sep;63(3):199-213. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8341.1990.tb01613.x.
How does a child acquire knowledge that other people are subjects of experience, and come to differentiate amongst mental states? In this paper I review some philosophical perspectives on these matters. In order to illustrate how the arguments have contemporary relevance, I criticize the 'theory of mind' approach currently favoured by many psychologists and point out certain implications for our view of early childhood autism.
儿童是如何获得其他人是有体验的主体这一知识，并开始区分不同心理状态的呢？在本文中，我将回顾关于这些问题的一些哲学观点。为了说明这些论证如何具有当代相关性，我批评了当前许多心理学家所青睐的“心理理论”方法，并指出了其对我们看待幼儿自闭症观点的某些影响。
