Weill Cornell Medical College, New York City, New York, USA.
Health Aff (Millwood). 2012 Apr;31(4):797-805. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2011.0626.
Medicare's flagship hospital pay-for-performance program, the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration, began in 2003 but changed its incentive design in late 2006. The goals were to encourage greater quality improvement, particularly among lower-performing hospitals. However, we found no evidence that the change achieved these goals. Although the program changes were intended to provide strong incentives for improvement to the lowest-performing hospitals, we found that in practice the new incentive design resulted in the strongest incentives for hospitals that had already achieved quality performance ratings just above the median for the entire group of participating hospitals. Yet during the course of the program, these hospitals improved no more than others. Our findings raise questions about whether pay-for-performance strategies that reward improvement can generate greater improvement among lower performing providers. They also cast some doubt on the extent to which hospitals respond to the specific structure of economic incentives in pay-for-performance programs.
医疗保险旗舰医院按绩效付费计划,即 Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration,于 2003 年启动,但在 2006 年末改变了激励设计。其目标是鼓励更大的质量改进,特别是在表现较差的医院中。然而,我们没有发现证据表明这些变化实现了这些目标。尽管计划的变化旨在为表现最差的医院提供强有力的激励措施,以提高绩效,但我们发现,实际上,新的激励设计为那些已经达到参与医院整体质量绩效评级中位数以上的医院提供了最强的激励措施。然而,在计划实施期间,这些医院的改善程度并不超过其他医院。我们的研究结果引发了一些疑问,即是否基于绩效的付费策略能够为表现较差的医疗机构带来更大的改善。它们还对医院在多大程度上对基于绩效的付费计划中的经济激励的具体结构做出回应产生了一些怀疑。