Gärling T
Department of Psychology, University of Umeå, Sweden.
Scand J Psychol. 1990;31(3):220-2. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9450.1990.tb00833.x.
In a commentary on a note by Rönnberg (Rönnberg, J. On the distinction between perception and cognition. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 1990, 31, 154-156), it is argued that one of Rönnberg's criteria for theoretically distinguishing perception from cognition, that of different biological purposes, is invalid. Congruent with a broad definition of perception and cognition which most researchers agree upon, Rönnberg's two other criteria essentially state that how internally represented information is processed distinguishes between perception and cognition. However, the more strict criterion of whether explicit retrieval of information from memory is necessary is too dependent on a particular, rather limited theoretical framework. A third, less theory-dependent criterion of whether the information available in the stimulus is sufficient to account for comprehension may be useful in research which investigates hypotheses about similarities between perception and cognition.
在对伦贝里的一篇注释的评论中（伦贝里，J.《论感知与认知的区别》。《斯堪的纳维亚心理学杂志》，1990年，第31卷，第154 - 156页），有人认为，伦贝里在理论上区分感知与认知的标准之一，即不同的生物学目的，是无效的。与大多数研究者所认同的感知和认知的宽泛定义相一致，伦贝里的另外两个标准本质上指出，内部表征信息的处理方式区分了感知和认知。然而，关于是否需要从记忆中明确检索信息这一更为严格的标准过于依赖一个特定的、相当有限的理论框架。第三个不太依赖理论的标准，即刺激中可用的信息是否足以解释理解，可能在研究感知与认知之间相似性假设的研究中有用。
