Feler Leo, Henderson J Vernon
Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Department of International Economics, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, 7th Floor, Washington, DC 20036, United States.
J Urban Econ. 2011 May 1;69(3):253-272. doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2010.09.006. Epub 2010 Oct 22.
Localities in developed countries often enact regulations to deter low-income households from moving in. In developing countries, such restrictions lead to the emergence of informal housing sectors. To deter low-income migrants, localities in developing countries withhold public services to the informal housing sector. Using a large sample of Brazilian localities, we examine migration and exclusion, focusing on the public provision of water to small houses where low-income migrants are likely to live. Withholding water connections reduces the locality growth rate, particularly of low-education households. In terms of service provision, during dictatorship in Brazil, we find evidence of strategic exclusion, where localities appear to withhold services to deter in-migration. We also find evidence of strategic interactions among localities within metro areas in their setting of service levels: if one locality provides more services to migrant households, other localities respond by withholding service.
发达国家的地方政府常常制定法规，以阻止低收入家庭迁入。在发展中国家，此类限制导致了非正规住房部门的出现。为了阻止低收入移民，发展中国家的地方政府不给非正规住房部门提供公共服务。我们以巴西大量地方政府为样本，研究移民与排斥问题，重点关注向低收入移民可能居住的小房屋提供公共供水服务的情况。停止供水连接会降低地方政府的人口增长率，尤其是低教育水平家庭的人口增长率。在服务提供方面，我们发现，在巴西独裁统治期间，存在战略排斥的证据，即地方政府似乎通过停止服务来阻止人口迁入。我们还发现，大都市地区内各地方政府在设定服务水平方面存在战略互动的证据：如果一个地方政府向移民家庭提供更多服务，其他地方政府会通过停止服务来做出回应。
