University of Gothenburg, Box 200, Gothenburg 40530, Sweden.
J Med Ethics. 2012 Nov;38(11):692-3. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100831. Epub 2012 Aug 23.
This paper discusses Nicholas Agar's argument in Humanity's End, that it can be morally permissible for human beings to prevent the coming into existence of morally enhanced people because this can harm the interests of the unenhanced humans. It contends that Agar's argument fails because it overlooks the distinction between morally permissible and morally impermissible harm. It is only if the harm to them would be of the morally impermissible kind that humans are provided with a reason to prevent the coming into existence of enhanced people. But if their enhancement includes moral enhancement, it is unlikely that the enhanced people will cause morally impermissible harm.
本文讨论了尼古拉斯·阿加（Nicholas Agar）在《人类的终结》（Humanity's End）一书中的观点，即人类可以出于道德目的阻止具有更高道德素质的人的出现，因为这可能会损害未增强人类的利益。本文认为，阿加的观点是错误的，因为它忽略了道德上允许的伤害和不道德的伤害之间的区别。只有当对他们的伤害属于不道德的伤害时，人类才有理由阻止增强型人类的出现。但是，如果他们的增强包括道德增强，那么增强型人类不太可能造成不道德的伤害。
