Bian Boyang, Gorevski Elizabeth, Kelton Christina M L, Guo Jeff J, Martin Boone Jill E
James L. Winkle College of Pharmacy, University of Cincinnati Academic Health Center, Cincinnati, OH, USA.
J Manag Care Pharm. 2012 Sep;18(7):506-15. doi: 10.18553/jmcp.2012.18.7.506.
Cost savings from the use of generic drugs versus brand-name drugs are well known. Both private and public prescription drug plans encourage the use of generic drugs through a variety of mechanisms. The magnitude of cost savings for a given generic drug is dependent on the degree to which the generic market is competitive. Should the competitive structure become compromised, higher prices and reduced cost savings may result. An alleged conspiracy between Mylan Laboratories and its active-ingredient suppliers in 1997 was associated with an increase in seller concentration in the generic lorazepam market. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) alleged that Mylan raised costs to consumers by $120 million because of price increases for generic lorazepam from March through December 1998 and for generic clorazepate from January through December 1998. In November 2002, a settlement with Mylan was approved by the FTC, and a federal district court required Mylan to pay $147 million, including $28.2 million to state agencies including Medicaid.
To (a) describe the seller concentration in the national Medicaid generic lorazepam market over a 19-year period from January 1991 through December 2009, (b) estimate the excess payments for generic lorazepam by Medicaid between 1998 and 2009, and (c) investigate potentially increased utilization and prices of 2 substitute pharmaceuticals: branded lorazepam (Ativan) and generic alprazolam (another widely used intermediate-acting benzodiazepine).
Using Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data from the Centers for Medicare Medicaid Services, we calculated the 4-firm concentration ratio (CR₄) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the Medicaid generic lorazepam market, along with pre-rebate reimbursement for pharmacy claims, number of claims (utilization), and average pre-rebate reimbursement per claim (average "price") for generic lorazepam, from 1991 through 2009. Medicaid's excess payments were estimated under 2 different assumptions regarding what the average generic lorazepam price would have been in the absence of the alleged conspiracy. To find counterfactual prices, the average per-claim reimbursement for lorazepam for the 4 quarters prior to the alleged conspiracy, $6.80, was inflated using (a) the quarterly change in the average per-claim reimbursement for generic alprazolam and (b) the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban consumers, all goods. Potential impact of the alleged conspiracy on the branded lorazepam and generic alprazolam markets was investigated.
The average pre-rebate reimbursements per claim for generic lorazepam were $10.25, $23.12, and $8.48 in 1991, 1998, and 2009, respectively. For the same 3 years, CR₄ = 52.80, 76.02, and 86.74, while HHI = 905.71, 2,166.25, and 2,233.36. Medicaid's excess payments from 1998-2009 were estimated at approximately $625-$657 million. The data also suggest the possibility of small impacts on the utilization of branded lorazepam and the price of generic alprazolam.
Prior to the alleged conspiracy in 1997, average pre-rebate reimbursement per claim for generic lorazepam was declining, while seller concentration was rising. After a jump in average payment per claim in the years immediately following the alleged conspiracy, prices have gradually returned to their pre-1998 levels. However, the generic lorazepam market was more concentrated in 2009 than prior to the alleged conspiracy.
使用非专利药相对于品牌药所节省的成本是众所周知的。私人和公共处方药计划都通过多种机制鼓励使用非专利药。给定非专利药的成本节省幅度取决于非专利药市场的竞争程度。如果竞争结构受到损害,可能会导致价格上涨和成本节省减少。1997年,迈兰实验室(Mylan Laboratories)与其活性成分供应商之间被指控存在共谋,这与非专利劳拉西泮市场卖方集中度的提高有关。美国联邦贸易委员会(FTC)称,由于1998年3月至12月非专利劳拉西泮以及1998年1月至12月非专利氯氮卓价格上涨,迈兰使消费者成本增加了1.2亿美元。2002年11月,FTC批准了与迈兰的和解协议,一家联邦地方法院要求迈兰支付1.47亿美元,其中包括向包括医疗补助计划在内的州机构支付2820万美元。
(a)描述1991年1月至2009年12月这19年期间全国医疗补助计划非专利劳拉西泮市场的卖方集中度;(b)估计1998年至2009年期间医疗补助计划为非专利劳拉西泮支付的超额费用;(c)调查两种替代药物:品牌劳拉西泮(阿替凡)和非专利阿普唑仑(另一种广泛使用的中效苯二氮卓类药物)潜在的使用量增加和价格上涨情况。
利用医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心的医疗补助计划州药物使用数据,我们计算了1991年至2009年医疗补助计划非专利劳拉西泮市场的四企业集中度比率(CR₄)和赫芬达尔-赫希曼指数(HHI),以及药房报销申请的回扣前报销金额、报销申请数量(使用量)和非专利劳拉西泮每项报销申请的平均回扣前报销金额(平均“价格”)。在关于若无被指控的共谋非专利劳拉西泮平均价格会是多少的两种不同假设下,估计了医疗补助计划的超额支付。为了找到反事实价格,使用(a)非专利阿普唑仑每项报销申请平均报销金额的季度变化和(b)所有城市消费者所有商品的消费者价格指数(CPI),将被指控共谋前四个季度劳拉西泮每项报销申请的平均报销金额6.80美元进行了调整。调查了被指控的共谋对品牌劳拉西泮和非专利阿普唑仑市场的潜在影响。
1991年、1998年和2009年,非专利劳拉西泮每项报销申请的平均回扣前报销金额分别为10.25美元、23.12美元和8.48美元。同样这三年,CR₄分别为52.80、76.02和86.74,而HHI分别为905.71、2166.25和2233.36。1998 - 2009年医疗补助计划的超额支付估计约为6.25亿至6.57亿美元。数据还表明对品牌劳拉西泮的使用量和非专利阿普唑仑的价格可能有小的影响。
在1997年被指控的共谋之前,非专利劳拉西泮每项报销申请的平均回扣前报销金额在下降,而卖方集中度在上升。在被指控的共谋之后紧接着的几年里,每项报销申请的平均支付金额跃升之后,价格已逐渐回到1998年之前的水平。然而,2009年非专利劳拉西泮市场比被指控的共谋之前更加集中。