Center for Economic Studies: Energy, Transport & Environment, KU Leuven, Belgium.
Waste Manag Res. 2012 Sep;30(9 Suppl):36-42. doi: 10.1177/0734242X12453379.
Although economic theory supports the use of extended producer responsibility (EPR) to stimulate prevention and recycling of waste, EPR systems implemented in Europe are often criticized as a result of weak incentives for prevention and green product design. Using a stylized economic model, this article evaluates the efficiency of European EPR systems. The model reveals that the introduction of static collection targets creates a gap between theory and implementation. Static targets lead to inefficient market outcomes and weak incentives for prevention and green product design. The minimum collection targets should be complemented with a tax on producers for the non-collected waste fraction. Because such a tax internalizes the cost of waste disposal, more efficient price signals will lead to better incentives for waste management in a complex and dynamic market.
尽管经济理论支持采用扩展生产者责任 (EPR) 来促进废物的预防和回收，但欧洲实施的 EPR 系统经常受到批评，因为它们对预防和绿色产品设计的激励作用较弱。本文使用一种程式化的经济模型评估了欧洲 EPR 系统的效率。该模型表明，静态收集目标的引入造成了理论与实践之间的差距。静态目标导致市场结果效率低下，对预防和绿色产品设计的激励作用较弱。最低收集目标应辅以对未收集废物部分的生产者征税。由于这种税收将废物处理成本内部化，因此更有效的价格信号将在复杂和动态的市场中为废物管理提供更好的激励。
