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研究机构与卫生系统绩效之间的联系:一个框架及以布隆迪两项基于绩效的筹资计划分析为例的说明

Studying the link between institutions and health system performance: a framework and an illustration with the analysis of two performance-based financing schemes in Burundi.

作者信息

Bertone Maria Paola, Meessen Bruno

机构信息

Nationalestraat 155, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium. E-mail:

出版信息

Health Policy Plan. 2013 Dec;28(8):847-57. doi: 10.1093/heapol/czs124. Epub 2012 Dec 7.

DOI:10.1093/heapol/czs124
PMID:23221122
Abstract

Institutional arrangements of health systems and the incentives they set are increasingly recognized as critical to promote or hinder performance in the health sector. Looking at complex health system interventions from an institutional perspective may contribute to better understanding what are the paths and processes that lead to the results of such interventions. In this article, we propose an analytical framework drawing from new institutional economics. This framework suggests seven dimensions to look at: institutions, enforcement mechanisms, property rights, incentives, interactions between extrinsic and intrinsic sources of motivation, behavioural changes and organizational performance. For illustrative purposes, we then apply the framework to the analysis of the institutional (re)arrangements of two performance-based financing (PBF) schemes in Burundi by carrying out an empirical comparison of case studies. We use mainly qualitative data from primary and secondary sources and analyse them with focus on the seven dimensions of the framework. The analysis of the case studies provides a comparative narrative of the two PBF schemes and highlights the differences in their operational design, the challenges faced during implementation and the adaptations made. From a methodological perspective, this article proposes a tool to analyse complex health system interventions, looking beyond the evaluation of the final effects to focus on the processes through which institutional (re)arrangements affected those results. Its application indicates, at an empirical level, that such analysis could help identify lessons regarding the design of health systems interventions, such as PBF schemes, and the process of reforming institutional arrangements.

摘要

卫生系统的制度安排及其设定的激励措施,对于促进或阻碍卫生部门的绩效越来越被视为至关重要。从制度视角审视复杂的卫生系统干预措施,可能有助于更好地理解导致此类干预措施产生结果的路径和过程。在本文中,我们提出了一个借鉴新制度经济学的分析框架。该框架建议从七个维度进行审视:制度、执行机制、产权、激励措施、外在与内在动机来源之间的相互作用、行为变化以及组织绩效。为便于说明,我们随后通过对案例研究进行实证比较,将该框架应用于对布隆迪两项基于绩效的融资(PBF)计划的制度(重新)安排的分析。我们主要使用来自一手和二手资料的定性数据,并围绕框架的七个维度对其进行分析。案例研究分析提供了这两项PBF计划的比较性叙述,并突出了它们在运营设计上的差异、实施过程中面临的挑战以及所做的调整。从方法论角度来看,本文提出了一种分析复杂卫生系统干预措施的工具,超越对最终效果的评估,转而关注制度(重新)安排影响这些结果的过程。其应用在实证层面表明,此类分析有助于识别有关卫生系统干预措施(如PBF计划)设计以及制度安排改革过程的经验教训。

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